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Introduction
In 1981, the American Bar Association ("ABA"), bolstered by a grant
from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, decided to
develop standards for governing the involvement of persons with mental
disabilities in the criminal justice system.' To accomplish this task the
*
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1.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS xvi-xvii (AM. BAR ASS'N 1989)

(hereinafter "Standards").
[1]
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ABA established six task forces, each focused on a different topic, and
each composed of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law professors,
and mental health professionals well-known for their expertise about
criminal mental health law. 2 The result, promulgated in 1984 by the
ABA's House of Delegates, was more than eighty black letter Criminal
Justice Mental Health Standards, accompanied by commentary that
spanned more than 400 pages in the first edition and over 500 pages in the
second edition. 3 Among other issues, the Mental Health Standards dealt
with: (1) the role of mental health professionals in the criminal justice
system; (2) the interaction between the police and people with mental
disorders; (3) general issues concerning evaluations and testimony by
mental health professionals; (4) competence to participate in the legal
process; (5) the insanity defense and related defenses; (6) commitment of
insanity acquittees; and (7) special commitment, sentencing, and prison
issues that affect offenders with mental disorders.
Since the Standards were adopted, there have been vast changes in
mental health law, knowledge about mental disability, and the
constitutional and evidentiary rules governing mental health evaluations.
Recognizing the significance of these changes, in August 2012 the
Standards Committee of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section established an
interdisciplinary group force tasked with examining the Standards in their
entirety and drafting proposed revisions to reflect current law and best
practices. The new Task Force was composed of twelve members: three
law professors, one judge, two prosecutors, two defense attorneys, two
psychiatrists, and two psychologists. 6 Liaisons from the National Alliance
2.

Id.

3. See id. The second edition included new material on competency to confess and
competency to be executed.
4. See id. at vii-xi (Table of Contents).
5. See Memorandum from the Criminal Justice Section Standards Comm. and the Task
Force on Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards to Criminal Justice Council I (Sept. 10, 2015)
(on file with author).
6. The members of the Task Force were: Christopher Slobogin, Vanderbilt University Law
School (Chair); W. Lawrence Fitch, Professor, University of Maryland School of Law (Reporter);
Richard Bonnie, Professor, University of Virginia School of Law; Steven Leifinan, Judge, 11th
Judicial Circuit, Fla.; Richard Burr, Defense Attorney, Houston, Texas; Virginia Murphrey, Chief
Public Defender, 10th Judicial Circuit, Anoka, Minn.; Guy Arcidiacono, Deputy Chief, Appeals
Bureau, Forensic Litigation Unit, Suffolk County, N.Y.; William F. Klumpp, Jr., Office of
Attorney General, St. Paul, Minn.; Alex Buchanan, Ph.D., M.D., FRCPsych, Associate Professor
of Law & Psychiatry, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; Steven K. Hoge, M.D., Director,
Columbia-Cornell Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship Program, Clinical Professor, Columbia
University College of Physicians and Surgeons, New York State Psychiatric Inst., N.Y.; Kirk
Heilbrun, Ph.D., Professor, Drexel University, Phil., Pa.; Randy Otto, Ph.D., Florida Mental
Health Institute, Tampa, Fla.
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on Mental Illness, the Department of Justice, and the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers were also heavily involved.
The Task Force deliberated for over three years. Ultimately, it
recommended significant revisions to virtually every aspect of the
Standards, including in each of the seven areas noted above. After vetting
by other groups within the ABA,8 the revised Standards were adopted by
the ABA's House of Delegates in August 2016.9
This article discusses the Standards in more detail, using as an
organizational template three goals that I think explain much of the
Standards.'o The first goal that permeates the Standards is ensuring that
people with mental disabilities who encounter the criminal justice system
are treated humanely and fairly. Achieving this goal requires a delicate
balance between providing the treatment necessary to ensure the safety and
health of these individuals and avoiding interventions that are not legally
necessary. A second goal of the Standards is to promote reliable case
outcomes. This goal requires substantive doctrines that recognize the
mitigating impact of mental disabilities and an adequate evaluation system
that permits clinicians to gather the information they need to address legal
questions; treatment is an important element of this goal as well when
necessary to enable a defendant's meaningful participation in the legal
proceedings. The third goal is to honor the autonomy of people with
mental disabilities by ensuring their desires and decisions are accorded
appropriate respect by their own lawyers and the rest of the criminal justice
system. The Standards adopt the position that competent defendants should
have the power not only to participate but also to control the most
important aspects of their case.

7. See Memorandum to Criminal Justice Council, supra note 5, at 1-2.
8. In particular, as is the case with all ABA Criminal Justice Standards, the Mental Health
Standards were reviewed by the Standards Committee and by the Criminal Justice Section
Council. See Criminal Justice Standards Committee, AM. BAR AsSOC., http://apps.ameri
canbar.org/dch/committee.cfn?com=CRI05000; Criminal Justice Section Council Leadership
Roster, AM. BAR ASSOC., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal-justice/about-us.html.
9. House of Delegates Resolution 107, AM. BAR ASsOC., http://www.americanbar.
org/news/reporter-resources/annual-meeting-2016/house-of-delegates-resolutions/107.html/. The
official version of the Standards can be found at CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
2016),
ASS'N
BAR
(AM.
STANDARDS
aba/publications/criminal-justice-standards/mental-healthstandards_2016.authcheckdam.pdf.
10. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily shared
by the members of the Task Force, the Standards Committee, the Council, or the ABA at large.
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I. Goal #1: Humane and Dignified Treatment
Hundreds of thousands of people with mental disorders are enmeshed
in the criminal justice system." Unfortunately, that system does not
always treat them fairly or humanely. Police who may not be familiar with
the symptoms of mental disorder often mishandle encounters with people
who have mental problems, sometimes with disastrous consequences. 12
People who should be taken to a hospital may instead be taken to jail,
where their mental health needs may be ignored or underserved.1 3 Defense
attorneys may fail to adjust their style of communication to take into
account impairments of their clients,1 4 or may focus solely on narrow legal
issues when a more holistic approach might prove both more beneficial to
their clients and less likely to miss key aspects of the relevant legal or
psychological problems.' 5 Prosecutors may assume that most people with
mental disabilities are dangerous,16 or may be reluctant to recognize the
11. In 1998, 283,800 of the people housed in American jails and prisons (16% of the total)
suffered from serious mental disorders. PAULA M. DITrON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 1

(1999). Many experts estimate the number is much higher. Fox Butterfield, PrisonsBrim With
Mentally Ill, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/
07/12/us/prisons-brim-with-mentally-ill-study-finds.html?r-0.
12. See City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (involving a person with
mental illness shot several times by police); Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893
(6th Cir. 2004) (involving the arrest of a man with autism who died after being pepper sprayed,
handcuffed and bound).
13. Mental Health Treatment in Jails and Prisons, JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CENTER FOR
MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Oct. 2000), http://www.bazelon.org/criminal3.html ("Mental health
deteriorates in jail: Jails and prisons are inappropriate places for those with mental illnesses
because of the stress of the environment and the lack of mental health services."); see also
Christin E. Keele, Note, Criminalizationof the Mentally Ill: The ChallengingRole of the Defense
Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 UMKC L. REV. 193, 196 n.32 (2002) ("[T]he
hostile and stressful environment within the jail system does not suffice to provide a therapeutic
setting for those with mental illness.").
14. John Matthew Fabian, PracticePoints, CHAMPION, June 2007, at 2-3 (noting that "the
criminal defense attorney often does not have extensive background and training ... regarding
how to deal with clients who have mental illnesses, psychiatric diagnoses, and other
impairments" because these clients may: have trouble understanding the process; make
"unrealistic requests"; be "angry, distrustful" and not cooperative; be "passive and not involved in
decision making"; refuse to accept advice; be fearful of being labeled 'crazy' or 'mentally ill"';
resist pretrial evaluation, a plea bargain or an insanity defense; and exhibit "radical beliefs").
15. Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 313, 321 (2009) ("The crushing caseloads, combined with the attorneys' lack of familiarity
with mental illness and the increasing number of seriously mentally ill criminal defendants, cause
defense attorneys to brush aside or purposely ignore competency issues.").
16. Certainly media and culture reinforce that view. See, e.g., Patricia Stout et al., Images
ofMental Illness in the Media: Identifying Gaps in the Research, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 543,
545-51 (2004) (finding that "[p]ersons with mental illness were depicted as being inadequate,
unlikable, and dangerous ... and as lacking social identity.").
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treatment needs of a defendant or the mitigating impact of mental
disorders. 17 Judges can be impatient with defendants who do not
comprehend the court process.' 8 They may also fail to recognize a
defendant's important treatment needs; in particular, they may neglect to
make sure that necessary treatment is continued once a defendant is
returned to the community after restoration of trial competence, 1 9 or impose
a sentence of incarceration without taking sufficient account of diversion
programs and other alternatives to imprisonment.20 Correctional personnel
handling prisoners with mental disabilities may not properly diagnose such
individuals or treat them. 2 1 Forensic mental hospitals for defendants found
incompetent to stand trial or legally insane may retain individuals far
22
beyond the time necessary, and judges and lawyers can abet this neglect
by putting such individuals at the tail end of the docket once he or she is
hospitalized.2 3

17. Cf Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 289 (2004) (where the prosecutor argued that the
defendant's intellectual disability was not relevant to mitigation, but only dangerousness).
18. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY 663-70 (1994) (asserting that trial
court judges may use certain terms (e.g., "psycho-babble" or "headshrinkers") that reveal "their
subconscious prejudices against mentally ill offenders," and also tend to believe such individual
fabricate their symptoms and to display impatience towards mentally disordered defendants,
incorrectly attributing their plight to "weak character or poor resolve.").
19. Keri K. Gould, And Equal Participationfor All ... the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 123, 143 n.140 (1993-1994) (noting that defendants often go
off medication after restoration to competence in the hospital and that this "revolving door
syndrome may continue for years"); see generally, Katherine B. Cook, Revising Assisted
Outpatient Treatment Statutes in Indiana: ProvidingMental Health Treatmentfor Those in Need,
9 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 661, 668 (2012) (describing revolving door situations).
20. For a description of the problem and the assertion that problem-solving courts can be
the solution, see Peggy Hora, Problem-Solving Judge pts. 1-4, CUTTING EDGE LAW,
http://www.cuttingedgelaw.com/video/judge-peggy-hora-problem-solving-judge.
21. See, e.g., Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (finding with
respect to the California prison system "substantial evidence in the record of seriously mentally ill
inmates being treated with punitive measures by the custody staff to control the inmates' behavior
without regard to the cause of the behavior, the efficacy of such measures, or the impact of those
measures on the inmates' mental illnesses").
22. Gwen A. Levitt et al., Civil Commitment Outcomes of Incompetent Defendants, 28 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 349 (2010) (Defendants found not restorable were hospitalized
without meeting the civil commitment criteria, had longer lengths of stay, and were more likely to
be treated with psychotropic medications over their objection, when compared with other
inpatients.).
23. Nicholas Rosinia, How "Reasonable" Has Become Unreasonable: A Proposal for
Rewriting the Last Legacy of Jackson v. Indiana, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 673, 689-90 (2012)
(noting that over half the states either place no limit on the length of hospitalization permitted for
attempting restoration or tie the limitation to the sentence associated with the charge).
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The Standards address these and related concerns in a number of
ways. The over-arching standard on this point, standard 7-1.2, is worth
setting out in full:
(a) Officials throughout the criminal justice system should
recognize that people with mental disorders have special
needs that must be reconciled with the goals of ensuring
accountability for conduct, respect for civil liberties, and
public safety.
(b) Criminal justice officials should work with community
mental health treatment providers and other experts to
develop valid and reliable screening, assessment,
diversion, and intervention strategies that identify and
respond to the needs of individuals with mental disorder
who come into contact with the justice system, whether the
setting is traditional criminal court, problem-solving court,
a diversion program, or post-adjudication supervision and
monitoring.
(i) When appropriate, services should be
configured to divert people with mental disorders
from arrest and criminal prosecution into
treatment, consistent with . the [draft ABA
Diversion Standards].
(ii) Court systems should consider establishing
special dockets for defendants with mental
disorders, consistent with the [draft ABA
Specialized Courts Standards].
(iii) Criminal justice officials should consider
consulting
mental
health
professionals
knowledgeable about the possible impact of
culture, race, ethnicity, and language on mental
health in designing strategies to respond to persons
with mental disabilities in the criminal justice
system.
(c) Services should be available within correctional and
mental health facilities to facilitate both evaluation and
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treatment during incarceration and planning for treatment
124
upon release.
Other standards provide more specific means of ensuring fair and
humane treatment of people with mental disability in the criminal justice
system. They are briefly described below.
A.

The Roles of Police, Attorneys, and Judges in Assuring Treatment

As standard 7-1.2 states, every actor within the criminal justice system
should be attentive to the treatment needs of people with mental
disabilities. Part II of the Standards, entitled "Law Enforcement and
Custodial Roles," sets out a number of provisions designed to ensure that
police take appropriate actions when they encounter people with a mental
disability. Standard 7-2.1 provides that police agencies establish training
programs, staffed in part by qualified mental health professionals, designed
to assist police "in identifying and responding to emergency incidents
involving persons with mental disorders," and also calls for the creation of
"specialized police response teams," often called "crisis intervention
teams" ("CITs"), to deal with emergency situations.25 It also encourages
police agencies to create internal written policies governing police
interaction with people with mental disabilities and to negotiate
"memoranda of understanding" with community treatment entities that
make clear when and how these entities can provide emergency
treatment. 26 Standards 7-2.2 and 7-2.4 encourage police to seek voluntary
treatment dispositions when appropriate, 27 and standard 7-2.3 limits
coercive police action to situations where they have probable cause for
28
arrest or believe the individual meets involuntary commitment criteria.
The latter standard also provides that custodial decisions concerning people
29
with mental disability be made by CITs whenever possible, and that
police should "use only the physical control necessary to effect such
custody, taking into consideration the obligation of law enforcement
30
officers to protect the person, themselves, and others from bodily harm."

24.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-1.2 (entitled

"Responding to Persons with Mental Disorders in the Criminal Justice System").
25. Id., std. 7-2.1(c).
26. Id., std. 7-2.1(d).
27. Id., std. 7-2.2 (Preference for voluntary law enforcement disposition); std. 7-2.4(a)(ii).
28.
29.
30.

Id., std. 7-2.3(a).
Id., std. 7-2.3(b)(i).
Id., std. 7-2.3(b)(ii).
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Standards 7-1.4 to 7-1.6 focus on attorneys and judges. Consistent
with the ABA's Resolution on Comprehensive Criminal Representation,31
standard 7-1.4 admonishes defense attorneys to provide "inter-disciplinary"
client-centered representation, which requires familiarity with local
providers and programs that might serve as alternatives to incarceration, 32
as well as a willingness to consider mental health court (here, the standard
cross-references to the ABA Standards on Specialized Courts, which
express a preference for that mechanism for resolving disputes under
certain circumstances).3 3 The standard also reminds defense attorneys that
they will need to be prepared to deal with "difficulties in communication
that can result from the client's mental disorder or from transfers to a
different locale necessitated by treatment needs." 34
Standard 7-1.5 imposes a number of duties on judges and prosecutors.
It states that they "should consider treatment alternatives to incarceration
for defendants with mental disorders that might reduce the likelihood of
recidivism and enhance public safety," "facilitate meetings among
community organizations interested in assuring that services are provided
to justice-involved persons with mental disorders," help create diversion
and specialized court programs, and always consider "referring the
defendant for treatment, either voluntarily or, if appropriate, pursuant to
existing law relating to involuntary hospitalization or mandated outpatient
treatment."35
As with the police, the Standards strongly recommend
training related to these issues, including programs "addressing the
identification of and responses to individuals with mental disorders
involved in or at risk of becoming involved in the criminal justice system,"
and "strategies to facilitate diversion from the criminal justice system to the
community mental health treatment system before and after arrest,
adjudication, and conviction." 36

31. See HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 107C, AM. BAR ASSOC. (2012),
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/house-of delegates/resolutions/2012_- hod
annual-meeting_107c.doc (urging criminal defense organizations to establish connections with
civil law and social service organizations, provide "re-entry and reintegration services" for
clients, and train defense attorneys "how best to serve clients with civil legal and non-legal
problems related to their criminal cases").
32.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-1.4(a).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id., std.
Id., std.
Id., std.
Id., std.

7-1.4(e).
7-1.4(b).
7-1.5(a)-(e).
7-1.7(a).
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Treatment within the Criminal Justice System

As these various provisions suggest, one of the primary goals of the
Standards is to ensure that police, lawyers, and judges enable people with
mental disorders to avoid criminal justice involvement and imprisonment
where appropriate. The criminal justice system should never be used solely
as a means of obtaining mental health treatment. Thus, for instance,
standard 7-4.3(e) provides that:
Neither party should move for an evaluation of
competence in the absence of a good faith doubt that the
defendant is competent to proceed. Nor should either party
use the incompetence process for purposes unrelated to
assessing and adjudicating the defendant's competence to
proceed, such as to obtain information for mitigation of
sentence, obtain a favorable plea negotiation, or delay the
proceedings against the defendant. Nor should the process
be used to obtain treatment unrelated to the defendant's
competence to proceed; rather such treatment should be
sought pursuant to [standard 7-2.5, described below],
whether the defendant is in jail, the community, or an
inpatient facility. 37
As this language indicates, if a person with a mental disability does
end up in a jail, the Standards seek to ensure that appropriately limited care
takes place in this environment as well. To this end, standard 7-2.5
provides that jail personnel should be trained in identifying symptoms of
mental disorder and that all individuals in jail be screened for such
symptoms. 3 8 If discharge occurs, custodial staff are obligated to refer these
individuals to appropriate treatment facilities. 3 9 If instead the individual
remains in custody and treatment appears to be necessary, then jail
personnel are charged with arranging for treatment in jail or for transfer to
a treatment facility for those individuals who: (1) have been ordered by a
court to undergo treatment; (2) validly "assent" to it; 4 0 or (3) lack capacity
37. Id., std. 7-4.3(e).
38. Id., std. 7-5(a)-b).
39. Id., std. 7-2.5(c).
40. Under standard 7-1.1(f), an assent is valid if the person has a "present understanding of
the likely consequences of a particular course of action" and gives "an affirmative indication of
agreement with [that] action, after an explanation of the likely consequences of the action." The
definition is meant to recognize a shallow version of informed consent in order to facilitate
treatment of people with mental disability in cases where there is not an objection. See Bruce J.
Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
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to assent but have been found by an administrative panel to be
"experiencing extreme emotional distress or deterioration of functioning
that requires immediate treatment [that] is likely to stabilize the detainee's
condition, is the least intrusive method of doing so, and is medically
,,41
appropriate.
Similar treatment-oriented provisions apply at the sentencing stage.
Consistent with the ABA's Standards on Sentencing, 42 standard 7-8.2
requires that a presentence report be prepared that describes: (1) the
offender's condition and current and past treatment; (2) "programs or
resources, such as treatment centers, residential facilities, vocational
training services, educational and rehabilitative programs, and, in
particular, community-based mental health services, that would be
appropriate for the offender's condition;" (3) "any condition relating to the
offender's likelihood of adhering to treatment;" (4) "whether assignment of
a specialized probation officer or a case manager trained in monitoring
offenders with mental disorder would be appropriate in the offender's
case;" and (5) whether a comprehensive mental health evaluation is
needed.43 The judge may make mental health treatment a condition of
probation, ideally supervised by a specialized probation officer;44 at the
same time, the standard provides that the judge should not deny probation
simply to ensure the offender receives treatment that is only available in
prison. 45
The Standards are also attentive to treatment issues that occur during
incarceration after conviction. Standard 7-10.1 states that correctional
facilities should: (1) provide "appropriate and individualized mental health
treatment to prisoners with mental disorder;" (2) ensure that correctional
officers are appropriately trained about how to deal with prisoners who
have mental disorder; and (3) only subject such individuals to isolation
under very limited circumstances outlined in the ABA's Standards on
Treatment of Prisoners.46 Also tracking the latter standards, the Mental

Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 169 (1991) (arguing for a
presumption of competence in such circumstances).
41.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note

42.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON SENTENCING, std. 18-5.4 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1993),

9, std. 7-2.6(a)-(c).

http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal-justice-section-archive/crimjust-standards-se
ntencing-toc.html.
43.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-8.2(a)-(e).

44. Id., std. 7-8.6(c)-(d).
45. Id., std. 7-8.6(a).
46. Id., std. 7-10.1(a)-(c); see CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS, std. 23-3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
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Health Standards set up procedures for emergency treatment (both after
conviction and after sentencing), voluntary transfer, involuntary transfer of
prisoners to a mental health facility, and return from that facility to
The non-emergency involuntary hospitalization procedure
prison.47
requires clear and convincing proof of a need for treatment at an
adversarial hearing in front of a judge or administrative hearing officer.4 8
When a prisoner refuses psychiatric medication, standard 7-10.4 requires
the same hearing process, except that a correctional official may be part of
the decision-making panel. 4 9 Going beyond the protections required by
Supreme Court case law,50 the standard permits involuntary medication
only "if the prisoner is suffering from a serious mental disorder, nontreatment poses a significant risk of serious harm to the prisoner or others,
the treatment is medically appropriate, and no less intrusive alternative is
reasonably available." 5
C.

Treatment of Defendants Found Incompetent or Insane

Finally, Part IV of the Standards, on competence issues, and Part VII
of the Standards, dealing with disposition of persons found non-responsible
due to mental disability (i.e., "insanity acquittees"), adopt a number of
innovative procedures designed to ensure rational treatment of these two
groups. First, a defendant who, because of confusion or an inability to
communicate, is likely to be found either incompetent to proceed with the
adjudication process or incompetent to make key decisions need not be
adjudicated on that issue. Standard 7-4.8 provides that:
[I]n lieu of or after a [competence] hearing, the parties may
request that the court dispose of the case by either
dismissing the charges without prejudice or placing the
charges in abeyance, pending the defendant's successful
participation in treatment, if (i) based on the reports of the
aba/publishing/criminalj usticesectionnewsletter/treatmentoLprisoners-commentarywebsite
.authcheckdam.pdf.
47.

See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-8.1 (entitled

"Emergency Treatment"); std. 7-10.2 (entitled "Voluntary Transfer to Mental Health Facility");
std. 7-10.3 (entitled "Involuntary Transfer"); std. 7-10.6 (entitled "Return to Correctional
Facility").
48. Id., std. 7-10.3(a).
49. Id., std. 7-10.4(b).
50. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226 (1990) (permitting "medically
appropriate" involuntary medication for a competent prisoner who is mentally ill and poses a
substantial risk to himself or others, but not requiring that the medication be the least intrusive
treatment).
51.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-10.4(a).
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evaluators, it appears that the defendant is incompetent to
proceed but would be a suitable candidate for mental
health treatment, or (ii) the prosecutor and the defense
attorney agree that such diversion would be preferable to
an order for restoration of competence to proceed, and (iii)
the defendant assents to such diversion. 52
If such diversion does not occur and the court finds that the defendant
is incompetent or that his or her competence depends upon the continuation
of treatment, the Standards provide, consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Jackson v. Indiana,53 that the court may impose treatment to
restore competence only if "there is a substantial probability the treatment
will restore the defendant to competence in the foreseeable future." 54
Treatment for restoration to competence is to be on an outpatient basis
unless the court determines that no less restrictive treatment setting is
available and an inpatient setting can provide the necessary treatment.55 If
the defendant is committed and later found competent, and then is
convicted and sentenced, any period spent in treatment is credited toward
the sentence. 5 6 Whether treatment occurs on an outpatient or inpatient
basis, standard 7-4.11 requires the treating entity to develop a treatment
plan within fourteen days.57 While antipsychotic medication is often the
treatment of choice in this situation, the standard permits medication over
the defendant's objection only if, in conformance with the Supreme Court's
holding in Sell v. UnitedStates:58
(i) [T]he government's interests in prosecuting the
defendant are important; (ii) the medication proposed is
substantially likely to restore the defendant to competence
and substantially unlikely to have side effects that will
interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist
counsel; (iii) the medication is necessary to restore

52. Id., std. 7-4.8(e).
53. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) ("We hold ... that a person charged by a
State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to
trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there
is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.").
54. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-4.1 0(a)(i).
55. Id., std. 7-4.10(b)(ii)-(iii).
56. Id., std. 7-4.16.
57. Id., std. 7-4.11(b).
58. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-82 (2003) (detailing limitations on forcible
medication).
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competence, and any less intrusive treatments are unlikely
to achieve the same result; and (iv) the medication is in the
defendant's best medical interests in light of the
defendant's medical condition. 5 9
The Standards also obligate the entity carrying out the treatment to
make periodic reports on treatment progress and to alert the court if it is
determined the defendant is unrestorable.6 0 Upon such a report, and in any
event within twelve to eighteen months, a competence hearing must be
held.6 1 If the court confirms the defendant has not been restored, then, per
Jackson, the defendant must either be released or civilly committed,
although commitment initially may be to a more secure forensic facility if
the court deems that disposition appropriate. 6 2 If instead the defendant
becomes competent, further adjudication can of course take place. To
avoid the revolving door situation that can arise when a restored defendant
is returned to jail or to the community and allowed to decompensate there
awaiting trial, standard 7-4.11 provides that "the court should order as a
condition of the defendant's return that the receiving facility or local
treatment facility continue such treatment as the inpatient facility may
recommend to maintain the defendant's competence," unless the facility is
63
not competent to provide it.
Part VII's provisions regarding persons found not guilty by reason of
insanity also include several innovations. Consistent with the preference
for noncriminal dispositions throughout the Standards, defendants acquitted
on less serious offenses are subject only to general civil commitment.
Individuals acquitted of offenses "involving acts causing or creating a
substantial risk of death or threatening serious bodily harm," in contrast,
are subject to special commitment procedures that make initial post-verdict
commitment relatively easy. However, at subsequent commitments, the
state's burden increases. 6 5 Specifically, standard 7-7.5 provides that, at the

59.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-4.11(d).

60. Id., std. 7-4.12(a).
61. Id., std. 7-4.14(b).
62. Id., std. 7-4.14(c).
63. Id., std. 74.11(e).
64. Id., std. 7-7.2 (differentiating between "offenses involving acts causing, threatening, or
creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm" and offenses that do not cause such
harms or risks).
65. Id., std. 7-7.2(a).
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initial hearing (which should usually take place within forty-five days of
the verdict 66 ), the individual is committable if the court finds:
(i) [B]eyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee
committed the criminal act for which he or she was
acquitted. . . , unless the trier of fact made such a finding
at the acquittee's criminal trial . . . , and (ii) by a
preponderance of the evidence that, due to mental disorder
of the type [that supported the insanity defense], the
acquittee is at risk for causing a substantial risk of bodily
harm to others in the foreseeable future if not committed,
or (iii) by a preponderance of the evidence that the
acquittee does not meet the criteria in (b)(ii) due to the
effect of treatment currently being received, in which case
the acquittee may be committed unless the acquittee proves
by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee will
continue to receive such treatment following release for as
long as the treatment is required.6 7
In contrast, at hearings that take place a year or longer after this initial
hearing the state must prove either (ii) or (iii) by clear and convincing
evidence.68
Standard 7-7.4 states that insanity acquittees should be committed to a
forensic mental health facility only if they are unable to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that conditional release will "provide
adequate protection of the community." 69
Standard 7-7.12 provides
detailed guidance on the structure and process of conditional release
programs, with the goal of ensuring both adequate treatment and protection
of the community. To get a sense of the standard, consider its first section,
which recommends that every state establish "conditional release programs
(CRP) with sufficient staffing and resources" to discharge the following
responsibilities:
(i) Reviewing any proposed plan for conditional release
and contacting all service providers named in the plan to
determine their capacity and willingness to (a) provide the

66. Id., std. 7-7.3(a) (requiring an evaluation within thirty days of the acquittal) & 7-7.3(d)
(requiring a hearing within fifteen days of the evaluation).
67.
68.
69.

Id., std. 7-7.4(b).
Id., std. 7-7.8(b).
Id., std. 7-7.4(c).
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services specified in the plan, (b) submit periodic reports to
the CRP regarding the acquittee's participation in services,
and (c) immediately notify the CRP if an acquittee is noncompliant with or otherwise no longer appropriate for
services from the provider;
(ii) Monitoring an acquittee's compliance with the
conditional release order by reviewing reports provided by
service providers named in the order and maintaining
accessibility to providers [twenty four] hours per day,
[seven] days per week, to receive reports of noncompliance;
(iii) Immediately notifying the prosecutor of any allegation
or other indication that the acquittee has failed to comply
with the conditions of a conditional release order or no
longer is appropriate for conditional release;
(iv) Before an acquittee's term of conditional release
expires, arranging for providers serving the acquittee to
assess the acquittee's likelihood of continuing to receive
necessary services without a conditional release order in
place and reporting the same to the court and the attorneys
for the acquittee and the state; and
(v) Organizing periodic training for service providers in
the jurisdiction regarding the special service needs of
individuals on conditional release and the procedures for
reporting to the CRP.70
These and other provisions in the Standards are designed to facilitate
transition of insanity acquittees into the community without undue risk.
Nonetheless, standard 7-7.10 gives the prosecutor authority to notify
"relevant individuals and agencies" if full or conditional release of an
72
acquittee occurs.

70. Id., std. 7-7.12(a).
71. See id., std. 7-7.12(b) & (d) (calling for detailed release plans and incorporation of plan
into court order); id., std. 7-7.12(d) (requiring notification of prosecutor upon breach of
condition).
72. Id., std. 7-7.10.
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These commitment procedures for defendants found incompetent or
insane, together with those governing the hospitalization of jail detainees
and prison inmates described earlier, are the only criminal justice-related
mechanisms for commitment recognized in the Standards. Thus, the
Standards reject the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision holding in
Kansas v. Hendricks,73 which upheld, against due process and other
challenges, a statutory scheme that permitted commitment of offenders
who have completed their sentence so long as they have a "mental
abnormality" that "predisposes" them to commit violent sex offenses.74
About twenty states have comparable statutes. 7 5
Standard 7-10.7
specifically prohibits this type of commitment, for reasons that have been
well-explained in the literature.76 It states that once a sentence has expired,
comintment may occur only under the state's "general commitment
statute" and calls for repeal of all "statutes that provide for post-sentence
commitment of offenders using criteria that differ[s] from the general civil
commitment criteria." 77 At the same time, standard 7-10.8 provides,
consistent with the ABA's Standards on Treatment of Prisoners,78 that
procedures "ensuring a smooth transition to the community for prisoners
with mental disorder[s]" should be adopted.7 9
D.

Summary of Standards Regarding Treatment

As this account indicates, the ABA's Mental Health Standards are
attentive to the treatment needs of people with mental disabilities at every
stage of the process, but avoid making those needs an excuse for
unnecessary confinement. All actors in the system, including police,
correctional personnel, lawyers, and judges, are charged with acquiring
adequate knowledge about, training on, and resources for meeting the
treatment needs of people with mental disability in the criminal justice
system.For individuals accused of minor crimes, diversion or handling
through specialized courts is preferred. For those found incompetent or
73. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
74. Id. at 371.
75. Cynthia Caulkins et al., Sexual Violence Legislation: A Review of Case Law and
Empirical Research, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 443, 445-48 (2014).
76. See Ryan K. Melcher, There Ain't No End for the "Wicked": Implications of and
Recommendations for § 4248 of the Adam Walsh Act After United States v. Comstock, 97 IOWA
L. REv. 629, 661-63 (2012); Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy:
Desert/DiseaseJurisprudence,48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1077, 1120-24 (2011).
77.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-10.7(b).

78.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, supra note 46, std. 23-

8.9 (regarding transition to the community).
79.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-10.8.
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insane, treatment is provided, but placement in restrictive forensic units is
either time-limited or restricted in other ways and forcible treatment with
medication is tightly controlled.
For defendants who are convicted,
treatment is once again a priority, with a preference for treatment in the
These provisions
community or a mental hospital when appropriate.
of the criminal
goals
by
the
limited
and
should ensure that, consistent with
justice system, people with mental disability obtain adequate, humane
services.

II. Goal #2: Reliable Outcomes
The second overarching goal sought by the ABA's Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards is a system designed to reach legally and morally
valid outcomes. The Supreme Court has recognized that, for a number of
reasons, people with mental disabilities may be at greater risk of wrongful
conviction than others in the criminal process.8 0 People with mental
disorders are less likely to understand their rights during interrogation and
are more likely to confess to crimes they did not commit. 8 ' They may have
difficulty communicating exculpatory or mitigating facts to their attorney. 8 2
Impairment in the ability to understand witnesses may compromise their
right of confrontation. 83
The potential for unreliable outcomes is even greater when the focus
moves from determining whether the defendant committed a criminal act to
Defendants are not
assessment of legally relevant mental states.
necessarily the best source of information about their mental condition at

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
81. See Richard Rogers et al., Knowing and Intelligent: A Study of Miranda Warnings in
Mentally DisorderedDefendants, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 401, 408 (2007) (finding that only 10%
of people with a mental disability had a good understanding of Miranda warnings); Morgan
Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded
Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 590-91 (2002) (finding people with intellectual disabilities and
even many individuals with lQs above 75 have great difficulty understanding Mirandawarnings);
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544-45 (2005) (finding that almost all false confessions came from juveniles
or people with mental disability and that the latter group was more likely to confess falsely than
the former).
82. See David A. Green, "I'm OK-You're OK": EducatingLawyers to "Maintaina Normal
Client-Lawyer Relationship" with a Client with a Mental Disability, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 65, 8386 (2003-2004) (discussing the need for respectful discourse with people who have mental
disabilities and recognizing such clients may have cognitive and communication limitations and
might want to hide their disability).
83. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 ("Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give
meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses . . . .").
&

80.
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the time of the crime. Even where they are, an adequate defense usually
requires assessment of that condition by qualified experts who are given
full access to relevant information and who are not unnecessarily inhibited
in reporting their opinions.85 In addition, the substantive law regarding
mental state issues needs to be defined in a way that permits full
exploration of all possible exculpatory and mitigating factors. 6 The
Standards contain a number of provisions designed to deal with these
considerations.
A.

Procedural Protections Generally

'

The typical method of protecting against inaccurate outcomes is to
ensure that procedural mechanisms are in place. As indicated in Part I, the
Standards provide such mechanisms in every context they address. For
instance, the Standards require: (1) open adversarial hearings in connection
with competency adjudications;87 (2) emergency treatment;88 (3)
commitment of insanity acquittees; 89 and (4) prison-to-hospital and
hospital-to-prison transfers,9 although none of these procedures are as
formalized as they would be at an insanity trial. 9
84. See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence:
Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 19-25 (1998) (cataloguing the extent to which memory,
confused desires, and self-deception can distort an accurate depiction of one's past mental states).
85. See Honorable Mark I. Bernstein, Jury Evaluation of Expert Testimony under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 7 DREXEL L. REv. 239, 264 (2015) (criticizing the federal rules of
evidence, and in particular Rules 703 and 705, for "empower[ing] the expert to hide personal
credibility judgments, to quietly draw conclusions, to individually decide what is proper
evidence, and worst of all, to offer opinions without even telling the jury the facts assumed").
86. Providing detailed support for this proposition is beyond the scope of this article. But
see generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 393-94 (5th ed. 2010) (describing
justifications for a relatively broad insanity defense); id. at 286-87 (describing justifications for
adopting subjective mens rea requirements); id. at 481-84 (describing justifications for adopting a
partial responsibility doctrine); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("[T]he Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."); United States v. Lewinson, 988 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
mental disorder need not be "severe" to warrant downward departure as long as it resulted in
"significant impairment" that affects "behavior and decision-making during the offense period").
87.

See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-4.9.

88. Id., std. 7-2.6 (detailing emergency treatment while in jail); std. 7-8.1 (explaining the
standards for emergency treatment prior to sentencing).
89. Id., std. 7-7.5 (regarding special commitment hearings).
90. Id., std. 7-10.3(c).
91. For instance, at hearings to determine whether an insanity acquittee may be committed,
an adverse inference may be drawn from noncooperation, id., std. 7-7.5(e), and the other
procedures mentioned may not require a judge or even an advocate. See standards described
supra note 87-90.
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Procedural protections during adjudication are important. However,
when a person with mental disability is involved in the criminal justice
system, adversarial hearings may not be enough to ensure against erroneous
outcomes. For example, as noted above, interrogation is a significant
source of inaccuracy in cases involving people with a mental disability.
Standard 7-2.4(d) provides that:
[L]aw enforcement officials who are considering
interrogation of a detained person ... should recognize that
persons with mental disorders may be unusually
susceptible to persuasion and should be alert to the
possibility that official conduct may be more likely to
constitute impermissible coercion or result in an invalid
waiver of rights when an individual with mental disorder is
questioned. 92
Standard 7-5.4 also encourages courts to exclude statements that the
court considers unreliable due to the effects of mental disorder even if no
official misconduct is involved. 93
Defense attorneys can also inadvertently cause inaccuracy or miss
important facts because they do not realize how suggestible or confused
some people with a mental disability can be. 94 Standard 7-1.4 reminds
defense attorneys that they will need to be prepared to deal with
"difficulties in communication that can result from the client's mental
disorder or from transfers to a different locale necessitated by treatment
needs." 95 This standard further requires that attorneys:
[E]xplore all mental state questions that might be raised,
including whether the client's capacities at the time of
police interrogation bear on the admissibility or reliability
of any incriminating statements that were made, whether
the client is competent to proceed at any stage of the
adjudication, and whether the defendant's mental state at
the time of the offense might support a defense to the

92.
93.

Id., std. 7-2.4(d).
See id., std. 7-5.4(b) & (d).

94.

Cf BRYAN

TULLY

&

DAVID

CAHILL,

POLICE

INTERVIEWING OF

MENTALLY

HANDICAPPED PERSONS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 29-30 (1984) (finding that mentally
handicapped individuals produce inaccurate information even when interviewed by police who,
because they were being observed, presumably did not want to lead or mislead the subjects).
95.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-1.4(b).
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charge, a claim in mitigation of sentence, or a negotiated
disposition. 9 6
Finally, Standard 7-1.4 notes that attorneys should talk with family
members and other third parties who are able to provide relevant
information about the defendant with a mental disorder. 97
B.

Assuring Competence to Proceed

In the course of these investigations, the defense attorney may
conclude that the client's competence is in doubt, thus increasing the
likelihood that the client will be unable to provide relevant information for
investigative or confrontation purposes. The Standards refer to this issue as
"competence to proceed" rather than competence to stand trial to indicate
that, under the due process clause, an individual must be competent at all
important proceedings to ensure an ability to assist counsel in challenging
the state's evidence and arguments. 98
Thus, the Standards require
competence in connection with trial, guilty plea hearings, sentencing,
appeals, and collateral review. 99
In all of these settings, the Standards adopt the test set out in the
Supreme Court's decision in Dusky v. United States,'" which states that, to
be considered competent to proceed, a person must have "sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him."10
While the test is the
same in every proceeding, the Standards recognize that context matters.
Thus, for example, in the guilty plea context the Standards highlight "the
nature and complexity of the charges and the potential consequences of a
conviction."l02 When the defendant is contemplating waiving counsel, the

96. Id., std. 7-1.4(c).
97. See id., std. 7-1.4(d).
98. See id., std. 7-4.1(a) & (d).
99. See id., std. 7-4.1(a) (requiring competence to proceed "In any criminal proceeding that
takes place prior to or during adjudication of guilt and that requires the presence of the defendant,
other than a proceeding pertaining to the defendant's competence to proceed and proceedings
(such as bail hearings) where a competence requirement would seriously prejudice the defendant,
the defendant must be competent to proceed."); std. 7-8.7 (requiring competence to proceed at
noncapital sentencing); std. 7-8.8 (requiring competence to proceed on appeal); std. 7-9.8(a)
(requiring competence to proceed at capital sentencing hearing); std. 7-9.9 (requiring competence
at post-conviction proceedings).
100. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
101. Id.at402.
102.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 74.2(a)(ii).
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relevant standard provides that the court should determine whether the
defendant "has a rational and factual understanding of the possible
consequences of proceeding without legal representation, including
difficulties the defendant may experience due to his or her mental or
emotional condition or lack of knowledge about the legal process." 0 3 The
Standards do not, however, flesh out the competence test to any greater
extent, given the considerable disagreement as to the precise factors that
should be considered.1 0 4
The important point about these various standards for present purposes
is that, with the goal of assuring a reliable process, standard 7-4.3 provides
that all parties-the defense attorney, the prosecutor, and the judgeshould seek an evaluation if they have a good faith doubt about the
defendant's competence to proceed or make decisions.' 0 5 Of particular
note, the defense attorney with a good faith doubt as to the defendant's
competence is required to seek evaluation of that issue even over the
defendant's objection.1 06 However, to avoid placing the defense attorney in
the position of overt conflict with the client or revealing attorney-client
communications, the standard gives the defense attorney discretion to
accomplish this goal through an ex parte evaluation.' 07
Of course, even an ex parte defense-initiated evaluation of
competence over the defendant's objection might cause tension between
lawyer and client. It might also lead to evaluation and hospitalization in
situations involving minor crimes when the alternative could be acceptance
of a plea deal that results in immediate release. 0 8 The fact remains that if a
defendant cannot communicate facts about the offense or mental condition
to his or her attorney or cannot grasp the consequences of the proceeding at
Id., std. 7-5.3(b)(ii).
104. For a sampling of the literature, see E. Lea Johnston, Setting the Standard:A Critiqueof
Bonnie's Competency Standard and the Potential of Problem-Solving Theory for SelfRepresentation at Trial, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1605 (2010); Christopher Slobogin, Mental
Illness and Self-Representation: Faretta, Godinez and Edwards, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 391
(2009).
103.

105.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-4.3; see also

std. 7-5.2(c) (regarding decisions within the defendant's control).
106. Id. Also relevant here is standard 4-8(b), which provides that special counsel should be
appointed to represent the defendant's position if counsel and the defendant continue to disagree
on the competence issue. Whether original counsel continues after this hearing will depend on its
outcome and the defendant's reaction to it.
107. Id., std. 7-4.3(c). This is a modification of the original standards, which required the
attorney to make a formal motion to the court when a good faith doubt exists and was one of the
more hotly contested standards.
108. See generally Rodney Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in
Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court, 1988
Wis. L. REv. 65, 89-96 (making these points).
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issue, the potential for an unreliable outcome significantly increases.
Furthermore, a "good plea deal," however beneficial on the front-end, can
have unforeseen consequences; convictions can adversely affect job
prospects as well as sentences for subsequent crimes even if they don't
result in immediate imprisonment.1 09 Other provisions in the Standards
should, if followed, alleviate defense attorney concern about unnecessary
confinement. As noted in Part I of this article, the Standards encourage
dismissal of charges and diversion in appropriate cases;110 prohibit use of
competence motions to obtain information for bargaining or sentencing
purposes; seek treatment unrelated to competence restoration, or cause
delay;"' require that evaluation and treatment take place in the community
whenever possible;I1 2 and place limits on the duration of the evaluation and
treatment process. 113
C.

Recognizing Mental State Defenses and Mitigation at Sentencing

The criminal justice system must endeavor to ensure reliable outcomes
not only with respect to the actus reus but also with respect to mental state
defenses.
The Standards adopt a fairly generous stance toward the
relevance of mental disability to criminal responsibility, tempered by
concerns about the ability of the behavioral sciences to provide relevant
information.
Thus, the Standards opt for a "liberal" version of the
M'Naghten test by adopting a test that asks whether the defendant, as a
result of mental disorder, "was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness" of
the criminal conduct."1 4 The word "appreciate" (rather than use of the word
"know," as in the original M'Naghten formulation) permits exploration of
the full range of cognitive dysfunction that might affect the defendant's
understanding of the criminal nature of his or her conduct.' 15 However, the

109. See Joanne Ilaria Davoli, Diverting the Mentally Ill Out of the Virginia CriminalJustice
System, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 109, 110 (2000) (noting that pleading guilty to a minor
crime can produce a conviction that leads to later sentence enhancements and untreated illness,
which can lead to further crime).
110.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-4.8(e).

111. Id., std. 7-4.3(e).
112. Id., std. 7-4.5(a) (regarding evaluation); std. 7-4.10(a) (regarding treatment).
113. Id., stds. 74.4(c), 7-4.5(b), and 7-4.12 (discussing periodic redetermination of
incompetence).
114. Id. The original M'Naghten formulation read: "To establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (HL 1843).
115. Thus, the drafters of the Model Penal Code thought that, while "know" implies a
superficial awareness, "appreciate" connotes a deeper emotional understanding. See MODEL
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test does not recognize a defense based on volitional impairment, based in
large part on the assumption (shared by the American Psychiatric
Association and others) that, determining the difference between an
irresistible impulse and an impulse that cannot be resisted is difficult, if not
impossible. 1" 6 The Standards also make two other concessions to the
difficulty of proving past mental states: they leave the burden of proof on
insanity up to the jurisdiction (while still requiring that the standard of
proof be a preponderance of the evidence)'7 and they exclude a defense
based solely on the acute effects of intoxication or on a condition
manifested solely by repeated antisocial conduct." 8
While their formulation of the insanity defense is not as broad as that
in some states,"l 9 the Standards also recognize several other means of
according mental disability exculpatory or mitigating effect. Following the
Model Penal Code (but only by about two-fifths of the states),1 20 standard
7-6.2 permits expert testimony that "tends to show the defendant did or did
not have the mental state required for the offense charged."'21 Standard 78.5 provides that mental disability should also have an impact on sentences,
by recognizing that the following two types of conditions should be
considered mitigating if they existed at the time of the offense:
Significant limitations in both cognitive functioning and
adaptive behavior, as expressed in conceptual, social, and
practical adaptive skills, resulting from intellectual
disability, dementia, or a traumatic brain injury [and]

PENAL CODE, § 4.01 cmt., app. C (AM. LAW INST. 1985) ("To appreciate the 'wrongfulness' of
one's offending act is to 'understand the idea as a matter of importance and reality; to grasp it in a
way that makes it meaningful in the life of the individual, not as a bare abstraction put in
words."').
116. See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1600-01
(1994) ("[I]t is famously the case that even if impulses do have coercive motivational force, it is
impossible to differentiate 'irresistible' impulses from those simply not resisted."); see also
Richard Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 196-97 (1983)
(providing arguments against the volitional prong).
117.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-6.9.

118. Id.,std.7-6.1(b).
119. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 750-51 (2006) (noting that seventeen states have
some version of the volitional prong of the insanity defense).
120.

PAUL H. ROBINSON, Loss OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC,

COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 291 (A. Reed & M. Bohlander eds., 2011)
(stating that about 40% of states allow evidence of mental disability when relevant to negate any
mental state, 30% limit such evidence to specific intent or homicide prosecutions, and 30% bar it
altogether).
121. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-6.2.
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[S]evere mental disorder, not manifested primarily simply
by repeated criminal conduct or attributable solely to the
acute effects of voluntary alcohol or drug use, that
significantly impaired the offender's capacity to appreciate
the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of conduct,
exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct, or
conform conduct to the requirements of the law.' 2 2
Part IX on capital sentencing, which did not exist in the original
Mental Health Standards, provides that the same two conditions should
lead to exemption from the death penalty.1 2 3 The first exemption-focusing
on intellectual deficits-goes beyond the Supreme Court's decision in
Atkins v. Virginia,12 4 which prohibited the execution of people with an
intellectual disability, by abandoning the requirement typically found in the
definition of that diagnosis that the age of onset occur before "eighteen.12 5
The second exemption-focused on people with mental illnessencompasses a group that, because they are at least as impaired as most
people with intellectual disability, should also be spared from the death
penalty.1 2 6 While these exemptions significantly expand the impact of
mental disorder in capital cases, they are not an innovation with the
Standards; they have been official ABA policy since 2006.127 Also
consistent with this policy, the Standards make clear that even if an
individual does not meet the exemption criteria, mental disability should
still be considered a mitigating circumstance that must be balanced against
aggravating factors,128 a requirement found in the capital sentencing
schemes of most states.' 2 9

122. Id., std. 7-8.5.
123. Id., std. 7-9.2(a) & (b).
124. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
125. Compare id. at 308 (noting that mental retardation requires onset of intellectual
disability before age 18) with Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014) (holding that the
definition of intellectual for disability for death penalty purposes should parallel the definition of
"professional societies").
126. See Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33
N.M. L. REv. 293 (2003).
127. HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 122A, AM. BAR ASSOC. (2012), http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/1786.
128.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-9.2(e).

129. Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts about Ring v. Arizona and the Jury's Role in
Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 550 (2011) (noting that virtually every death
penalty scheme adopts this approach but that "the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth
Amendment does not require any one particular means of balancing aggravating and mitigating
factors").
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Assuring Reliable Evaluations

All of the standards discussed in the previous section stand for the
proposition that a criminal justice system that does not recognize the
exculpatory and mitigating impact of a mental disability is not accurately
calibrating the blameworthiness of individuals with a mental disorder. Just
as important to the goal of enhancing reliable determinations of these issues
are numerous other standards aimed at ensuring that the criminal justice
system obtains the information it needs to resolve competency, insanity,
dangerousness, and related issues. Most of these standards appear in Part
III of the Standards, which is entitled, "Evaluations and Expert Testimony."
They set forth five means of enhancing this information-gathering process.
First, standards 7-3.9 and 7-3.10 contain provisions regarding the
necessary training and qualifications for the mental health professionals
who participate in the criminal justice system and provide most of the data
on mental health questions.1 3 0 These standards divide forensic experts into
three categories: court-appointed evaluators, evaluators who testify, and
"scientific experts." Under standard 7-3.10, court-appointed evaluators
who address competence issues should generally be psychiatrists,
psychologists, social workers, or psychiatric nurses who have met the
relevant licensing requirements, whereas court-appointed evaluators of
mental state at the time of the offense or of future risk generally should be
psychiatrists or psychologists.' 3 1 All such evaluators must not only possess
the necessary clinical knowledge, but also have received training on and
possess sufficient "forensic knowledge" about the particular legal issue
addressed in the evaluation; 132 even the most knowledgeable clinicians are
not very useful to the law if they do not understand the relevant legal
standards.1 33 Testifying experts must either meet the same requirements or,
if they are called to court because they have provided therapy to the person
at issue, be limited to testifying about "matters concerning the defendant's
general mental condition as presented during the therapeutic
relationship." 34 All testifying experts must also have "performed an
adequate evaluation, including a personal interview with the individual
130.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-1.3(a) (defining

roles of mental health professionals in the criminal justice system).
131. Id., std. 7-3.10(c)(ii). However, the standard also permits a licensed physician and
certified special education teacher, speech or language pathologist or audiologist to testify under
certain circumstances. See id. std. 7-3.10(c) (iii)-(iv).
132. Id., std. 7-3.9(a)(ii).
133. See generally Kirk Heilbrun & Stephanie Brooks, Forensic Psychology and Forensic
Science: A ProposedAgenda for the Next Decade, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 219 (2010)
(describing efforts to provide guidelines and training in forensic psychology).
134.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-3.9(b)(ii).
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whose mental condition is in question, relevant to the legal and clinical
matter(s) upon which the witness is called to testify."l 35 In contrast,
scientific experts-the third category of expert-need not have evaluated
the individual but must have the education and experience necessary to
"present scientific or clinical knowledge" relevant to the particular issue in
question.1 3 6
If the expert is testifying about risk or "dangerousness," as might
occur in commitment proceedings involving insanity acquittees and
perhaps in some sentencing proceedings, standard 7-3.8 outlines the factors
the expert should consider when determining whether mental disability is a
causal factor. These factors include:
[1] the clinical significance of the individual's history and
current behavior; [2] scientific studies involving the
relationship between specific behaviors and variables that
are objectively measurable and verifiable; [3] the possible
psychological or behavioral effects of proposed therapeutic
or other interventions; [4] the factors that tend to enhance
or diminish the likelihood that specific types of behavior
could occur in the future; and, finally, [5] the defendant's
performance on validated instruments for assessing risk
and need," but only when those instruments are
"administered, scored, interpreted and presented in
accordance with scientific and professional standards.' 3 7
Standard 7-1.5 also admonishes judges and prosecutors to rely,
whenever possible, on valid and reliable structured appraisals of relevant
risk and treatment (rather than unstructured clinical assessments) when
determining which defendants should be selected for participation in
diversion programs or specialized courts.1 3 8
Assume now that qualified experts are in place. As a second
reliability-enhancing mechanism, Part III seeks to ensure defendants have
recourse to this expert assistance, as required by the Due Process Clause
and the Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel.1 3 9
Standard 7-3.3 provides that indigent defendants should have access to
expert evaluators "if such services are reasonably necessary for an adequate
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id., std. 7-3.9(b)(iii).
Id., std. 7-3.9(c).
Id., std. 7-3.8(b).
Id., std. 7-1.5(e).
Cf Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1984).
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defense," and also should have access to "consultative experts" if "good
cause" is shown. 140 Other provisions echo this entitlement to expert
evaluators in specific contexts. 14 1
Third, the Standards admonish all parties-defense, prosecution, and
the court-to assist experts in the evidence-gathering process. To avoid
any confusion about the issues to be addressed, both the initiating party and
the court order (when the evaluation is not ex parte) are required to inform
the evaluator of the issue to be addressed.1 4 2 The initiating party or, if the
initiating party is the court, both the prosecution and defense, is further
obligated to provide the evaluator with "all records and other information
that . . may be of assistance in facilitating a thorough evaluation on the
matter(s) referred," including relevant medical and psychological records,
social history, police and other law enforcement reports, confessions or
statements made by defendant, investigative reports, autopsy reports,
toxicological studies, and transcripts of pretrial hearings. 4 3 In particular,
upon the request of the evaluator, the court is to "direct that the defendant's
relevant health care records be released,

. .

. with or without the defendant's

consent."'4
Fourth, the Standards describe steps for assuring an accurate record of
the evaluation is maintained. Standard 7-3.5 provides that, whenever
feasible, all evaluations initiated by the prosecution or the court are to be
recorded, preferably through video as well as audio.' 4 5 At the same time, to
avoid the possibility that lawyers will obstruct evaluator access to
information, neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney is entitled to be
present during such evaluations, unless the evaluator requests the attorney's
presence or the evaluation is focused on competence (and even then the
lawyer "should actively participate only if requested to do so by the
evaluator").1 4 6 The Standards adopt the position that, other than when the
evaluator needs the lawyer to be present to assess the attorney-client
relationship or to facilitate communication, the presence of an attorney is
more likely to harm rather than assist the evaluation process; further, the
recording requirement should alleviate attorney concern that evaluators will

140.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-3.3(a)().

141. See id., std. 7-4.3(a) (regarding judicial obligation to ensure competence); std. 7-8.3
(regarding expert assistance in noncapital sentencing); std. 7-10.3(b) (regarding prisoner's right to
testimony of treating professional at a transfer hearing).
142. Id., std. 7-3.4(a).
143. Id., std. 7-3.4(b).
144. Id., std. 7-3.4(e)(vi).
145. Id., std. 7-3.5(d)(ii).
146. Id., std. 7-3.5(c).
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abuse that process. In contrast, the Standards encourage "joint evaluations"
by both defense and state experts (or by a mutually agreed upon expert), on
the theory that the same information base will reduce both the tendency of
adversarial witnesses to emphasize facts relevant only to one side and the
likelihood that defendants will strategically change their story or invalidate
tests through practice effects. 14 7
Fifth, to further enhance the information-gathering capacity of
evaluators, the Standards seek to promote the defendant's full cooperation
by adopting a strong position on the application of the privilege against
self-incrimination. 14 8
Standard 7-3.2 prohibits the disclosure of
information obtained during a forensic evaluation, as well as evidence or
opinions derived from such evaluation, unless (1) the report relates solely
to a competence issue (and even then the report should not include any selfincriminating information from the defendant), or (2) the defendant
introduces or intends to introduce evidence on the issue addressed in the
report.1 4 9 This provision allows the evaluator to assure defendants that they
and their attorneys control when evaluation results can be used on issues
concerning guilt and innocence, and thus should encourage candid
communication with the evaluator.
Standard 7-3.2 also permits the
evaluator to breach confidentiality in one other situation-when the
evaluator concludes during the evaluation that the individual "presents an
imminent risk of serious danger to him or herself or to another person or
otherwise needs emergency intervention."' 50 However, that information
would be inadmissible in court except in the rare situation, perhaps at
sentencing, where the defendant asserts he or she is not dangerous and the
prosecution wishes to use the information in rebuttal.1 5

147. Id., std. 7-3.5(e).
148. The Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment applies in the forensic
evaluation context. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981). For a fuller explication of both
the Fifth Amendment and reliability rationales, see Christopher Slobogin, Estelle v. Smith: The
ConstitutionalContoursof the ForensicEvaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71, 109-14 (1982).
149. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-3.2(a).
150. Id., std. 7-3.2(b)(ii). The standard states that such disclosure should be consistent with
"applicable professional standards and statutory reporting requirements."
151. See United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 579 (2000) (holding that there is not a
"dangerous patient" exception to the clinician/patient privilege). If the defendant raises the issue
of non-dangerousness, however, the patient-litigant exception to the privilege might apply. See In
re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1970); see generally Deborah Paruch, From Trusted Confidant
to Witness for the Prosecution: The Case Against the Recognition of a Dangerous-Patient
Exception to the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 9 U. N.H. L. REV. 327 (2011).

Fall 20161

E.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS

29

Assuring Proper Use of Evaluation Results

Once the evaluation is complete, the legal system should maximize
use of its results. The Standards achieve this objective in two ways, having
to do with discovery and communication of expert opinions. First, if,
pursuant to the process just discussed, the defense decides to use evaluation
results to address mental state issues, the Standards opt for reciprocal
The
discovery, again in an effort to enhance reliable adjudication.
prosecution is entitled to a report from any defense expert who will testify
and, in return, the defense must receive any as-yet undiscovered reports and
information in the prosecution's possession "bearing on the issues
addressed by the defense expert."' 52 If a written report does not exist at the
time the defense indicates an intent to introduce the expert, then one must
be created.1 53 Standard 3-3.6(c) admonishes attorneys to avoid modifying
such reports "in any way that would compromise the report's integrity,"
although it also allows attorneys to correspond or converse with the expert
"to clarify the meaning or implications of the evaluator's findings or
opinions." 54
This procedure also applies in the capital sentencing context, but with
a twist, given the exemptions to death sentences mentioned earlier.
Standards 7-9.3 through 7-9.5 establish separate procedures for when the
defense is asserting an exemption based on intellectual disability and when,
instead, it is asserting an exemption based on mental illness or a mitigation
defense. In the former situation, the results of the evaluation are provided
to the prosecution once notice is given. ' In the latter situation, the results
of any pre-trial evaluation are provided either to a "firewalled" prosecution
"who may not share the reports or otherwise communicate about the
evaluation with the prosecutor responsible for the sentencing phase of the
trial" or, after conviction, to the prosecutor in charge of the sentencing
phase.1 5 6 The different procedures are necessary because, while an
assessment of whether a person is intellectually disabled should not reveal
any information about the offense, 157 an evaluation addressing the second
exemption may reveal incriminating information that the trial prosecutor
152.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-3.7(b).

153. Id., std. 7-3.7(b)(i).
154. Id., std. 7-3.6(c).
155. Id., std. 7-9.5(a).
156. Id., std. 7-9.5(b).
157. At least, this statement is true under the Standards' definition of the exemption, which
focuses solely on diagnosis. See id., std. 7-9.2(a). However, the Supreme Court will decide this
term whether Texas' definition of intellectual disability for death penalty purposes, which can
include an analysis of behavior during the offense, is constitutional. Moore v. Texas, 136 S. Ct.
2407 (2016). Under that definition, the procedure described in the text could not work.
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should not see before trial. Based on the same rationale, the results of any
pre-trial capital sentencing evaluation with regard to the second exemption
go only to the firewalled prosecutor or, after conviction, to the prosecutor
in charge of the sentencing phase. 58 While these procedures are in part
based on Fifth Amendment concerns,1 5 9 they also remove one disincentive
to be forthright during the evaluation process.
A final mechanism for promoting reliable decision-making on forensic
issues concerns the form in which expert opinions are delivered. At any
hearing, whether it occurs prior to trial, at trial itself, or at commitment or
sentencing, experts should be allowed to give their full opinion to the
extent it is clinically feasible, legally relevant, and otherwise permissible.
Thus, standard 7-3.11 provides that "the expert should identify and explain
the theoretical and factual basis for the opinion and the reasoning process
through which the opinion was formulated." 60 The standard continues:
In doing so, the expert should be permitted to describe
facts upon which the opinion is based, regardless of their
independent admissibility under the rules of evidence, if
the court finds that the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and similar relevant state provisions permit
admission of these facts and that: (i) they are of a type that
is customarily relied upon by mental health professionals
in formulating their opinions; (ii) they are relevant to serve
as the factual basis for the expert's opinion; and (iii) their
probative value outweighs their tendency to prejudice or
confuse the trier of fact.'61
Although the last clause is similar to language found in Rule 703 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 it intentionally avoids that rule's
placement of the word "substantially" before "outweighs," on the ground
that the expert should be able to explain all probative facts underlying the

158.

CRIMNAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-9.6.

159. Cf Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) (holding that "[a] criminal defendant,
who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence,
may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a
capital sentencing").
160. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-3.11(c).
161. Id.
162. See FED. R. EVID. 703 ("[I]f the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the
proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the
jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.").
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opinion, unless they are subject to exclusion under the Supreme Court's
confrontation jurisprudence.1 63
Another aspect of how expert opinions are communicated concerns
the extent to which the expert should be allowed to address the "ultimate
issue" (i.e., whether a person is "competent," "insane," or "dangerous").1 64
Some have argued that such testimony is not the domain of mental health
professionals because its import is solely legal.1 6 5 The Standards' position
is less absolute. Although standard 7-6.6 does state that experts should not
opine whether a person is "sane" or "insane" unless the jurisdiction
requires such testimony, in all other situations, standard 7-3.8 provides,
"expert testimony, in an opimion or otherwise, should be admissible
whenever the testimony is based on and is within the specialized
66
That standard
knowledge of the witness and will assist the trier of fact."'
goes on to say that "[i]f the jurisdiction requires the evaluator to present his
or her opinion on a question requiring a conclusion of law or a moral or
social value judgment, the evaluator should use cautionary language to
explain the boundaries of the expert's clinical expertise and the limitations
of the opinion."' 67
F.

Summary of Standards Aimed at Enhancing Reliability

Assuring reliable results in criminal cases involving people with
mental disabilities can be a difficult undertaking. Symptoms of mental
disability may not be discerned by attorneys or judges. Even if they are,
governing law may not adequately account for or fairly adjudicate their
effect, and attempts to assess and describe how they influence a criminal
defendant may suffer from lack of information or proper framing. The

163. Under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), a witness may not recount a
"testimonial" statement made by a third party unless that third party has been subject to crossexamination prior to trial or is a witness at trial. This ruling has been applied to third party
statements relied upon by psychiatric experts. See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727,
733 (N.Y. 2005).
164. See generally Christopher Slobogin, The "Ultimate Issue" Issue, 7 BEHAV. SC. & L.
259 (1989).
165. Stephen J. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the
Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REV. 971, 983 (1982) (noting that "experts should not be allowed to offer
opinions on nonscientific, ultimate legal issues").
166.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-3.8(a). Contrast

this position with decisions construing Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which prohibit the
expert from using the insanity test language even if it might also be based on specialized
knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Manley, 893 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting
questioning an expert about whether a person with manic-depressive psychosis would "be able to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of their actions").
167.

Id., std. 7-3.8(c).

32

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 44:1

Standards address each of these concerns through a number of mechanisms
designed to ensure that issues regarding competence, mental state defenses,
and risk are recognized, fully evaluated, and competently explained by
trained mental health professionals who are given full access to the relevant
information consistent with constitutional guarantees.
HI. Goal # 3: Autonomy and Dignity
Both mental health professionals and courts, echoing widely-held
societal views, have often automatically equated mental disability with a
lack of capacity to make decisions about important aspects of life.168
Parens patriae civil commitment laws, guardianship statutes, and
competency doctrines in the criminal justice setting are routinely construed
to authorize deprivations of liberty and property for anyone who
demonstrates significant pathology, without inquiry into the degree to
which the person in question understands relevant risks and benefits or the
specific reasons for a particular choice.1 69
The Standards assume, to the contrary, that people with mental
disabilities can be autonomous actors.
The standards governing
competence discussed in Part II of this article all take as a given that if a
person with a mental disability is competent with respect to the specific
choice at issue, he or she should be accorded the same rights as other
criminal defendants, regardless of other symptoms of mental disability the
70
individual may evidence. Doing so is probably constitutionally required.o
168. Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental DisabilityLaw: The Case of Incompetency, 47
U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 656-57 (1993) (explaining that "[e]mpirical studies show that mental
health professionals overpredict incompetence to stand trial, primarily because of the erroneous
belief that this status is synonymous with psychosis" and asserting that judges usually go along
with these types of opinions).
169.

CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH

MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 253-57 (2006) (noting that commitment and
competency laws often permit deprivations of liberty based on a finding of "a substantial disorder
of thought or mood that significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or
ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life" without requiring an assessment of the specific
reasons for making a decision).
170. The Supreme has held or strongly implied that a person with mental problems who is
nonetheless competent to make the relevant decision is entitled to: (1) waive counsel and plead
guilty, Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (holding that a finding that a defendant is
competent to stand trial and knowingly and voluntarily waives his rights is "all that is necessary
before he may be permitted to plead guilty or waive his right to counsel"); (2) refuse medication,
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 183 (2003) (indicating that a person who is "competent to
make up his own mind about treatment" should be allowed to do so); and (3) decide about
voluntary hospitalization, Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 114, 138 (1990) (requiring a "valid
consent" before voluntary hospitalization may take place). See also Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept.
of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass.1983) ("[A] mental patient has the right to make
treatment decisions ... until the patient is adjudicated incompetent by a judge . . . .").
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Furthermore, it ensures that these people are treated with dignity even if
their decision-making process, like that of many people who do not have a
diagnosis, seems imprudent at times.' 7
While the Standards do not go beyond the Dusky "rationality" test in
defining when a person is competent to make a particular decision, they do
address the related issue of which decisions by a competent defendant are
given controlling weight. In some jurisdictions, the decision about raising
the insanity defense is viewed as a tactical one to be made by the
attorney.1 7 2 Standard 7-6.3 instead provides that this decision is controlled
by the defendant, if he or she is competent to make it. 173 Consistent with
case law on this issue,1 7 4 the Standards also leave to the competent
defendant the decisions about whether to plead guilty, waive the jury, and
appeal.'17 However, the Standards allow the attorney to make the final call
about whether to raise a mens rea defense, challenge the death penalty, and
76
present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital case.'
These latter positions reflect the belief that, in contrast to the decision about
insanity-which arguably goes to the core of a person's self-definition and
can lead. to negative dispositional consequences' 77 -- concerns about

171. See generally Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining
Competency to Stand Trial, An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court's New
Due ProcessMethodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817, 859-60 (1993) (arguing
for a presumption of competency because it promotes "respect for individual autonomy" and
"psychological health").
172. See Robert D. Miller et al., Forcingthe Insanity Defense on Unwilling Defendants: Best
Interest and the Dignity of the Law, 24 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 487, 504 (1996) (reporting, based on
a survey of state attorneys general, that the defense can be raised over the defendant's objection
or without the defendant's knowledge in seventeen states); David S. Cohn, Offensive Use of the
Insanity Defense: Imposing the Insanity Defense Over the Defendant's Objection, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 295, 299-301 n.31 (1988) (noting that a sizeable minority of courts leave the
decision about whether to raise an insanity defense to the attorney).
173.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-6.3(a).

174. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983) (quoting with apparent approval
American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a), which states that "[i]n a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, . . . as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waivejury trial and whether the client will testify") (emphasis added).
175.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-5.2(a).

176. Id., std. 7-6.3(a)(regarding mens rea defense); std. 7-9.8(b) (regarding death penalty
challenges).
177. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376-78 (D.C. 1979) (detailing reasons for
prohibiting an insanity plea over a competent defendant's objection); H. Richard Uviller, Calling
the Shots: The Allocation of Choice Between the Accused and Counsel in the Defense of a
Criminal Case, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 726 (2000) (stating, in the course of arguing that the

decision should be the defendant's, that the insanity defense entails "the client's 'essential selfpresentation,"' and noting that it may be "peculiarly offensive to human dignity to argue for a
defendant that he was mad when he wants to argue mistaken identification or justification,"
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reliability should trump even the views of an autonomous individual where
technical mental states and the ultimate penalty of death are involved.178
However, if the defendant insists on a different strategy than the
attorney, then the Standards, again consistent with case law,1 79 permit a
competent defendant who wants to control the case to waive counsel. 80
The only issue then is whether, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Indiana v. Edwards,'18 the defendant can in fact proceed pro se or whether,
instead, the court may force counsel on the defendant on the ground that he
or she is incompetent to carry out "basic [trial] tasks."' 82 Standard 7-5.3
describes the inquiry as follows:
A defendant who is competent to elect to proceed without
representation by counsel may represent him or herself at
trial unless the court finds that, as a result of mental
disorder, (i) the defendant lacks the capacity to carry out
the minimum tasks required for self-representation at trial
to such a substantial extent as to compromise the dignity or
fairness of the proceeding, or (ii) the defendant will
significantly disrupt the decorum of the proceeding. 83
In all other circumstances, the dignity and autonomy of the individual
defendant is best promoted by allowing pro se representation.
Thus, the Standards resolve conflicts between the goal of honoring the
defendant's autonomy and the goal of assuring reliable results largely in
favor of the former goal.
However, the Standards also recognize
exceptions to the general rule that the defendant controls his or her own
defense. Further, of course, they insist that control of these decisions be
afforded only to those defendants who are competent to make them.

although also rejecting the idea that the insanity defense is entirely different from many other
defenses).
178. See Anthony J. Casey, Maintainingthe Integrity of Death: An Argumentfor Restricting
a Defendant's Right to Volunteerfor Execution at Certain Stages in CapitalProceedings, 30 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 75 (2002).
179. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that a competent defendant has
a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation).
180. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-5.3(a)
(stating that a defendant who is not competent to waive counsel may not do so, indicating by
negative inference that a competent defendant may do so).
181. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
182. Id. at 175-76 (indicating that a defendant proceeding pro se must be able to carry out
"the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel").
183.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 9, std. 7-5.3(d).
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Conclusion
The American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards represent a comprehensive approach to the adjudication and
treatment of people with mental disability who come into contact with the
criminal justice system. The Standards' genesis in the 1980s and their
revision in the past four years through the multistage vetting process
required by the ABA has produced a set of provisions that should provide
welcome guidance to the judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, police,
correctional officials, and mental health professionals who deal with this
population. Although the nature of mental disability makes them complex,
the Standards are a balanced attempt to promote fair and humane treatment
evaluations and
without compromising public safety, accurate
adjudications consistent with constitutional and other legal prerogatives,
and decision-making autonomy for people with mental disabilities that does
not offend competing reliability goals.
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